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ABSTRACT 
Cyberhate is a growing problem.  There is legislation in place that can be used to tackle various 
aspects of online hate, but in practice, the existing offences are difficult to use.  The law is 
fragmented, and does not capture the true nature of internet hate or provide adequate protection 
to victims.  This piece evaluates the current provisions and concludes with a framework for 
creating new legislation to tackle cyberhate which will be easier for the police and prosecutors to 
use, which will reflect more clearly the harm caused by hate on the internet, and which is also 
compatible with freedom of expression. 
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Cyberhate is a growing problem.  Although we do not have official statistics that can give as an 
accurate picture of the actual amount of online hate, several recent studies have found alarming 
levels of abuse.  For example, Tell MaMa reports that 70% of instances of Islamophobic hate 
reported to them is online hate,1 whilst the CST has found that over 20% of anti-semitic hate 
they record is internet-based.2  A survey by Galop suggests that 84% of LGBT+ people have 
experienced at least one occurrence of online abuse,3 whilst Ofcom reports that a third of 
children between the ages of 12-15 have been exposed to online hate speech.4  This is backed up 
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1 The figures have varied from year-to-year, but in 2014-15, online hate made up 70% of the reported incidents of 
Islamophobic hate -  https://www.tellmamauk.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/Tell%20MAMA%20Reporting%202014-2015.pdf accessed on 29 September 2017 
2 See page 27 at https://cst.org.uk/data/file/d/f/CST_Annual_Review_2016.1486995234.pdf - accessed on 29 
September 2017 
3 http://www.galop.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Online-hate-report.pdf accessed on 29 September 2017 
4 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0034/93976/Children-Parents-Media-Use-Attitudes-Report-
2016.pdf accessed on 29 September 2017 
by statistics from the NSPCC which suggest that 1 in 4 children has come across a racist or hate 
message online.5  An analysis by the think-tank Demos found that in the week following the 
Brexit referendum in June 2016, over 13,000 xenophobic or anti-immigrant tweets were sent on 
Twitter,6 and the UK Safer Internet Centre published a report that found that one in 4 children 
have suffered abuse online because of disability, race, sexual orientation, transgender identity or 
religion.7 
There is legislation in place that can be used to tackle various aspects of cyberhate, but in 
practice, the existing offences are difficult to use.  The law is fragmented, and there are several 
pieces of legislation at the disposal of the police and CPS depending on how the cyberhate 
manifests itself.8  The existing offences also do not capture the true nature of internet hate as the 
offences were either created before the dawn of the internet, or are not aimed at protecting 
victims of cyberhate.  As a result, one estimate suggests that only 9% of online hate is 
investigated.9  
This article will adopt a broad definition of cyberhate that encompasses any use of technology to 
express hatred10 towards a person or persons because of a protected characteristic – namely race, 
religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity.11  This definition will 
capture a great deal of activity that currently takes place on the internet, or through email and 
mobile telephone technology such as: religious abuse aimed at individuals by SMS text messages, 
anti-disablist comments aimed at a specific person on Twitter, racist statements appearing in 
below the line comments on newspaper websites, blogs devoted to homophobic and transgender 
hate, and misogynistic conversations on discussion forums.   
This article will evaluate the four main pieces of legislation currently used by the police and the 
CPS to tackle online hate crime in England and Wales, and will consider to what extent the law is 
                                                          
5 https://www.nspcc.org.uk/preventing-abuse/child-abuse-and-neglect/online-abuse/facts-statistics/ accessed on 
29 September 2017 
6 https://www.demos.co.uk/project/hate-speech-after-brexit/ accessed on 29 September 2017 
7 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/feb/09/internet-trolling-teenagers-online-abuse-hate-cyberbullying 
accessed on 29 September 2017 
8 See for example the Digital Trust’s Criminal Offences (Misuse of Digital Technologies and Services) Bill which 
aims to consolidate the disparate law in this area - http://www.digital-trust.org/victims-bill/technologybill accessed 
on 29 September 2017 
9 https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016-07-07/debates/16070729000001/OnlineAbuse accessed on 29 
September 2017 
10  There is a rich body of literature within hate crime academics discussing which is the most appropriate word to 
refer to this type of legislation.  See Nathan Hall Hate Crime (Routledge, 2nd edn, 2013) Chapter One.  The legislation 
in England and Wales has adopted the use of ‘hostility’ and ‘hatred’.  For the purposes of this article, a broad 
definition will be adopted.   
11 With the exception of gender, these characteristics are the ones currently covered by s.145 and s.146 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003.  It will be explained below why gender should be added to the list.   
able to deal satisfactorily with cyberhate in cases where the individual perpetrator can be 
identified and brought to justice.12  It will be argued that whilst the law is able to cover some 
aspects of cyberhate, it is not able to deal with the full spectrum of internet hate.  This is because 
the current legislation does not make a sufficient distinction between the different ways in which 
cyberhate can cause harm to individuals and society.  Thus, whilst the CPS has recently stated 
that it is determined to crack down on social media hate,13 the existing legal provisions are 
inadequate, and there is an urgent need for reform.  The piece will conclude with a framework 
for creating new legislation to tackle cyberhate which will be easier for the police and prosecutors 
to use, which will reflect more clearly the harm caused by hate on the internet, and which is also 
compatible with freedom of expression. 
 
Current Legislation 
There are several pieces of legislation that could potentially be used by prosecutors in cases 
involving cyberhate.14  In fact, the large number of available offences is one of the reasons why 
law enforcers have found this a difficult area to prosecute.15   However, four pieces of legislation 
appear to be the main focus of the literature:  the Public Order Act 1986, the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997, the Malicious Communications Act 1988, and the Communications Act 
2003.  The offences under these acts can be divided into two categories.  The first category 
includes offences which apply both to online and offline communications, and which have been 
specifically designed to deal with hatred or hostility.  The second category of offences are those 
which have been created to apply to online offences, but which are not specifically designed to 
deal with online behaviour that is hateful or hostile.  The existing offences will be analysed and 
their main flaws and problems will be highlighted. 
 
                                                          
12 It will not deal with cases where perpetrators remain anonymous because this category of cyberhate needs 
separate consideration as it involves a discussion of the role of third party intermediaries.  This has recently been 
discussed by the Report of the Home Affairs Committee Report on Hate Crime and its Violent Consequences 
Inquiry, ‘Hate Crime:  abuse, hate and extremism online’ 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/609/60902.htm accessed on 29 
September 2017. Cases such as Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja 
González (2014) and Delfi AS v. Estonia 64669/09 (2015) will not be discussed. 
13 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/aug/21/cps-to-crack-down-on-social-media-hate-says-alison-
saunders accessed on 29 September 2017 
14 See for example the Digital Trust’s Criminal Offences (Misuse of Digital Technologies and Services) Bill which 
outlines the many pieces of legislation which can be used in this area - http://www.digital-trust.org/victims-
bill/technologybill accessed on 29 September 2017 
15 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/04/online-abuse-existing-laws-too-fragmented-and-dont-
serve-victims-says-police-chief accessed on 29 September 2017 
A) Offences designed to deal with hatred or hostility 
 
First to be considered are three sets of offences:  firstly, the offences of ‘harassment’16 and 
‘stalking’17 under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (hereafter “PHA”); secondly the 
‘public disorder’ offences under sections 4, 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 (hereafter 
“POA”); and thirdly, the ‘incitement to hatred’ provisions under Part III of the POA;   
 
These offences can all be loosely described as ‘hate crimes’.  The term ‘hate crime’ does not have 
a specific legal meaning, but has been used flexibly to describe any legislation or legal response 
aimed at punishing criminal behaviour which demonstrates either hatred, or hostility18 towards a 
particular group in society.   
 
The public disorder offences and the harassment and stalking offences can all become 
‘aggravated offences’ by virtue of sections 31-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (hereafter 
“CDA”).  The CDA makes a crime an aggravated offence when a defendant demonstrated or 
was motivated by hostility towards a person on the grounds of race and religion19 in the course 
of committing a ‘basic offence’.  The list of basic offences is a closed one but does include the 
public disorder and harassment and stalking offences to be discussed here.  The aggravated 
version of an offence attracts a higher maximum penalty than the basic offence.  For example, 
the maximum penalty for a s.4 POA offence increases from 6 months to two years when 
aggravated by racial or religious hatred.20   
The ‘incitement to hatred’ offences were enacted to deal with hateful behaviour.  These offences 
have a long history21 rooted in anti-discrimination legislation, but in their current form they seek 
to criminalise behaviour which is threatening, abusive or insulting where there is an intention to 
thereby stir up racial hatred, or, having regard to all the circumstances, racial hatred was likely to 
                                                          
16 Protection from Harassment Act 1998, ss2 and 4.  Section 4 covers the offence of putting someone in fear of 
violence.   
17 Protection from Harassment Act 1998, ss2A and 4A.   
18 Or bias or discrimination 
19 Aggravated offences in relation to racial hostility were enacted under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, ss28-32, 
and racially aggravated offences were added by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 39.   
20 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 31(4)(b). 
21 See for instance, Gavin Schaffer, ‘Legislating against Hatred:  Meaning and Motive in Section Six of the Race 
Relations Act of 1965’ (2014) 25 Twentieth Century British History, and Ivan Hare, ‘Legislating Against Hate – The Legal 
Response to Bias Crimes’ (1997) 17 OJLS 415. 
be stirred up thereby.  These offences have now been extended, albeit in a more limited way, to 
religious and sexual orientation hatred.22   
In evaluating the effectiveness of the provisions under the POA and the PHA to enable the 
police to prosecute cyberhate, it is important to note at the outset that these offences are of 
general application and are not specifically targeted at online communications.  This means that 
it can be difficult to properly assess their efficacy as the Ministry of Justice data for these 
offences does not currently disaggregate online and offline use of these provisions.23  However, 
the assessment of the reported case law in this area which follows indicates that the courts have 
faced some technical difficulties in applying offline offences to online behaviour, and this has 
limited the effectiveness of these provisions.  Furthermore, it will be argued that these offences 
are not able to adequately capture the harm caused to victims of cyberhate and so there is a need 
to create separate offences targeted at the online communication of hate.   
 
1)  Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (“PHA”)  
 
The PHA makes it an offence to carry out a course of conduct which amounts to 
harassment24 and stalking.25 26    The mens rea is to know or ought to know that the behaviour 
amounts to harassment or stalking.27   As outlined above, if the defendant is motivated by or 
demonstrated hate whilst committing one of these offences, then this becomes an aggravated 
offence which increases the maximum penalty.28  The offences are result crimes which means 
that a victim must be identified, and to be shown to have suffered tangible harm.  There is no 
definition of ‘harassment’ but it is defined to ‘include’29 causing someone alarm or distress.  The 
Supreme Court in Hayes v Willoughby30 defined harassment as a ‘deliberate course of unreasonable 
and oppressive conduct, targeted at another person, which is calculated to and does cause that 
person alarm, fear or distress’ hence confirming that this is a result crime.  The harm which 
                                                          
22 The offences were extended to ‘religion’ by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, and to ‘sexual orientation’ 
by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 
23 See, for example, the Ministry of Justice’s most recent figures: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-quarterly-december-2015 accessed on 
29 September 2017. Use the ‘Outcome by Offence’ table. 
24 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, ss 2 and 4 
25 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, ss 2A and 4A   
26 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s 3 also makes harassment a civil wrong. 
27 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s 1(1)(b)  
28 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 32  
29 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s 7 
30 Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17 
needs to be proven under sections 4 and 4A is to fear that violence will be used against them or 
the victim is caused serious alarm which disrupts their day-to-day life.   
Whilst these offences were not created specifically with the internet in mind, they can go some 
way towards protecting individual victims who have been targeted online by a perpetrator.  In 
2009, Kelly Houghton became the first person to be jailed for harassment for sending 
threatening messages via Facebook.  Since then, the courts have continued to use the PHA to 
prosecute cases of cyber-harassment.  The recent case of R v Cordle31 is a good example of how 
the offence is used.  In this case, the defendant had sent text messages to his victims, as well as 
emails and messages on social media, all of which, in conjunction with offline behaviour, 
combined to form a course of conduct falling within the PHA.  Whilst currently there are no 
reported cases of racially or religiously aggravated harassment where technology was used, there 
have been successful prosecutions of offline aggravated harassment.32    
These cases demonstrate that the PHA can be used in some instances to protect victims of 
cyberhate harassment.  It is, however, difficult to find evidence to help us evaluate how effective 
this legislation is in practice.  The CPS and Ministry of Justice publish separately figures on the 
number of successful harassment prosecutions33 and on the CDA aggravated versions of these 
offences.34  However, the figures on harassment refer specifically to harassment against women 
and girls, and they do not tell us whether these were for online or offline behaviour.  The figures 
also do not disaggregate offences by how they were committed, so these figures cannot tell us 
how frequently these provisions are used against online behaviour; nor do they tell us how 
frequently the s.32 racial and religious aggravation offences are prosecuted.  The Hate Crime 
Report and the accompanying data also do not cover this as there is no disaggregation by offence 
or by mode of commission of offence.35  There is, therefore, an obvious problem in assessing 
the success of a provision in combatting cyberhate when the offence can be used for both online 
and offline behaviour.    A separate offence targeted specifically at online behaviour would make 
it easier to monitor and evaluate its efficacy as data which focusses exclusively on online hate 
could be more easily produced and analysed.  We do know, however, that the police have felt 
                                                          
31 R v Cordle [2016] EWCA Crim 1793 
32 For example, Jones v DPP [2010] EWHC 523 (Admin) 
33 See for example the Violence Against Women and Girls report 2015-16 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/cps_vawg_report_2016.pdf accessed 29 September 2017 
34 See for example Hate Crime report 2014-15 and 2015-16 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/cps_hate_crime_report_2016.pdf -accessed on 29 September 2017 
35 In fact, the PHA does not even appear as one of the ‘principal offences’ by strand - Hate Crime report 2014-15 
and 2015-16 https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/cps_hate_crime_report_2016.pdf -accessed on 29 
September 2017 page 32 
overwhelmed by the amount of hate and are finding the law difficult to use36 and the CPS has 
sought help from Twitter in order to cope with the increasing amount of online abuse.37      
There does, appear, however to be some evidence that the PHA is not necessarily the preferred 
legislation in online communications.   Geach and Haralambous38 have pointed out an 
interesting interplay between the Malicious Communications Act 1988 (discussed in more detail 
below) and the PHA.  In 2001, the Malicious Communications Act was updated to include 
online communications.  Once that change was implemented, Geach and Haralambous state that 
the CPS began to utilise this offence more than the PHA, even for cases involving online 
harassment.39  Furthermore, Coe offers evidence that suggests s.127(1)(a) of the 
Communications Act 2003 (also discussed in more detail below) is increasingly becoming the 
preferred option, even for online bullying cases with a seven-fold increase in the use of this 
offence from 2011/12 to 2013/14.40   
Looking beyond issues relating to collecting data on the use of these offences, there are some 
obvious constraints within the framework of the PHA that would explain why it has not been 
used as extensively as it could be for online behaviour.  As Salter and Bryden have pointed out, 
the requirement for a ‘course of conduct’41 under the PHA is a potential problem for online 
communications as it means that one-off communications will not count.42  Thus, an individual 
sending a racially abusive email to thousands of people would not be covered by the PHA.43 
Another limitation of the PHA is how it responds to covert surveillance over the internet.  A 
disagreement has arisen in the literature about the ambit of the stalking offences.44  McEwan 
argues that covert surveillance of a victim via the internet will not be covered by these offences 
because, by definition, covert surveillance is unknown to the victim.  This means that the victim 
                                                          
36 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11653092/Police-facing-rising-tide-of-social-media-
crimes.html accessed on 29 September 2017 
37 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/03/twitter-to-train-prosecutors-in-fight-against-online-
abuse accessed on 29 September 2017 
38 Neal Geach and Nicola Haralambous, ‘Regulating harassment:  is the law fit for the social networking age?’ (2009) 
73(3) Jounrnal of Criminal Law 241  
39 Neal Geach and Nicola Haralambous, ‘Regulating harassment:  is the law fit for the social networking age?’ (2009) 
73(3) Jounrnal of Criminal Law 241 
40 Peter Coe, ‘The social media paradox:  an intersection with freedom of expression and the criminal law’ (2015) 24 
Information & Communications Technology Law 16, 39-40 
41 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s 1(1) 
42 Micheal Salter and Chris Bryden, ‘I can see you:  harassment and stalking on the Internet’ (2009) 18(2) Information 
& Communication Technology Law 99 
43 Example from Micheal Salter and Chris Bryden, ‘I can see you:  harassment and stalking on the Internet’ (2009) 
18(2) Information & Communication Technology Law 99, 122 
44 Neil MacEwan, ‘The new stalking offences in English law:  will they provide effective protection from 
cyberstalking?’ (2012) 10 Criminal Law Review 767; Alisdair A. Gillespie, ‘Cyberstalking and the law:  a response to 
Neil MacEwan’ (2013) 1 Criminal Law Review 38;  
will not have experienced the requisite fear, alarm or distress, or fear of violence required by 
these offences.45  By contrast, Gillespie argues that where covert surveillance is discovered and 
thus, becomes known to the victim, this will be covered by the PHA if the victim suffers the 
harm required by the Act.46  Furthermore, he argues that even if the PHA cannot itself deal with 
the covert targeting of a victim’s computer technology, alternative provisions under the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 can be used 
instead.   
Even if we are to accept Gillespie’s view, this disagreement about the scope of the legislation, is a 
good example of the fragmented nature of the current law in relation to online harassment.  It 
demonstrates the difficulties the prosecution face when dealing with online harassment where 
several pieces of legislation could potentially be used depending on the fine nuances of the facts.  
When one considers this in the context of cyberhate, this problem is compounded further.  This 
is because whilst the PHA is an aggravated offence under the CDA, the Malicious 
Communications Act 1988, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 are not.  This means that certain forms of behaviour carry the additional 
penalty of an aggravated offence, whilst other forms of behaviour will not.  For example, if a 
perpetrator, motivated by racial hostility, were to hack into a victim’s computer and send 
messages from the victim’s email account, this would be an offence under the Computer Misuse 
Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, and the racial hostility would be taken into 
account at the sentencing stage of the offence only.47  However, if the victim were to become 
aware of the fact that their account had been hacked into and this caused them to suffer alarm, 
fear or distress, this would come under the PHA and the racial hostility would be taken into 
account at the offence stage, and would result in a higher maximum penalty.     This serves to 
illustrate the confusion that must arise at the prosecutorial stage when deciding which piece of 
legislation to charge.  
Another problem with the PHA is that it cannot be used for prosecuting comments not directed 
at the victim themselves, such as, for example, where someone has posted several aggressive and 
threatening anti-Islamophobic tweets on Twitter which are not directed at anyone in particular.  
It is doubtful that these posts would be considered harassment as the Supreme Court has 
                                                          
45 Neil MacEwan, ‘The new stalking offences in English law:  will they provide effective protection from 
cyberstalking?’ (2012) 10 Criminal Law Review 767 
46 Alisdair A. Gillespie, ‘Cyberstalking and the law:  a response to Neil MacEwan’ (2013) 1 Criminal Law Review 38 
47 Criminal Justice Act 2003, ss. 145-146 
recently stated in Hayes v Willoughby48 that harassment is the ‘conduct targeted at another 
person’.49 
This limitation of the harassment and stalking offences in relation to online hate demonstrates 
that the mischief at the heart of the PHA may not necessarily be ideally suited to the harm 
caused by online hate.  The PHA is concerned with the relationship between the harasser and the 
person who is being harassed.  It was designed to deal with situations where a person fears for 
their physical integrity because of the pattern of behaviour by the harasser.  The PHA is limited 
to the harasser/harassee relationship and does not extend to a bystander who may have observed 
the interchange between the two, or to cases where the hateful comments are not directed at 
anyone in particular.  Given that the internet, and particularly social media, gives people access to 
a very large audience, many instances of cyberhate will simply not fall into the purview of the 
PHA.   
This leads to an important question at the heart of the debate about the regulation of cyberhate, 
which is whether the regulation of cyberhate requires us simply to ensure that existing offences 
dealing with offline behaviour are modified so that they also apply online; or whether the harm 
caused to victims of cyberhate and to society more generally is sufficiently different to 
necessitate separate regulation in the form of discrete online hate offences.  In the context of 
cyberstalking, McEwan has argued that the offence is different in nature to ordinary stalking 
because it widens the pool of potential victims, it creates new ways in which a victim can be 
stalked, the stalking can be more intense because perpetrators feel less inhibited than in real life, 
and the anonymity of the internet often means that the stalking is more vitriolic.50   
A major theme of this paper will be to answer this central question and will be discussed in more 
detail below.  However, at this point it seems clear that the PHA will only offer protection to 
victims of cyberhate in cases where the perpetrator can be identified, where they have targeted 
their hate at one person or persons directly on more than one occasion, and where the targeted 
victim/s themselves have suffered harassment, alarm or distress.   
                                                          
48Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17  
49 Although in R (A Child) v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 17 the Divisional Court held that behaviour not directed at 
the victim could come within the PHA, on the facts of the case, the court was persuaded by the fact that the victim 
was ‘in the presence’ of the defendant when he was making threats to the victim’s dog.  Even if it could be said that 
Twitter users are ‘in the presence of threats’ made on Twitter, it was later clarified in the case of R v Qosja (Robert) 
[2016] EWCA Crim 1543 that the victim needs to fear that violence will be used against them, and not merely that it 
might.  It is difficult to see how general hateful messages on Twitter could satisfy this requirement.   
 
50 Neil MacEwan, ‘The new stalking offences in English law:  will they provide effective protection from 
cyberstalking?’ (2012) 10 Criminal Law Review 767 
  
2) Public Disorder Offences  
The next set of offences to consider are the public disorder offences under s.4, s.4A and s.5 of 
the POA.  Under s.4 of the POA it is an offence to use towards another person any words or 
behaviour or to display any writing or sign or other visible representation which is threatening, 
abusive or insulting.  The mens rea for this offence is an intent to cause that person to believe 
(or likely to believe) that unlawful violence will be used against them or another, or to provoke 
such violence by that person or another.  Under s.4A of the Act, an offence is committed if a 
person uses words, behaviour, writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, 
abusive or insulting, and which causes that or another person harassment, alarm or distress, and 
with intent to do so.  And finally, s.5 makes it an offence to use words, behaviour, writing, sign 
or other visible representation which is threatening or abusive within the hearing or sight of a 
person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress.    There are racially and religiously 
aggravated versions of these offences under the CDA.51   
In order to evaluate to what extent these offences are able effectively to tackle online 
communications, the important case of S v DPP52needs to be considered.  In this case, the 
defendant, who was protesting against animal testing at a lab, uploaded a picture of the victim - a 
security guard at the lab - onto a publicly available website, and implied, falsely, that the victim 
had convictions for violent offences and had manhandled protestors.  The police saw the 
photos, downloaded them, and about five months after they were first uploaded to the internet, 
they showed the victim copies of the photos.  Up until this point, although the victim was aware 
of the presence of the photos online, he had not actually viewed them on the relevant website.  
Crucially, it was not clear on the facts whether the photos were still available online at the point 
at which the victim was shown the copies.   The defendant was nevertheless convicted of a s.4A 
offence on the basis that the victim was caused harassment, alarm, or distress on being shown 
copies of the photos by the police, coupled with the knowledge that these photos had at some 
time been available on the internet.  The defendant subsequently appealed arguing that a 
substantial period of time had passed since the uploading of the photo, and so there was no 
sufficient nexus or causal link between the uploading and the subsequent harassment, alarm, or 
distress experienced by the victim, particularly given that there was no evidence that the material 
                                                          
51 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 31 
52 S v DPP [2008] EWHC 438 (Admin) 
was still available online at that moment.  His appeal was dismissed.  The court found it to be 
irrelevant whether or not the photos were still on the internet, and they said that the test to apply 
was:  but for the defendant’s actions, the victim would not have suffered, harassment, alarm or 
distress; they also concluded that the passage of time did not break the chain of causation.53  
Although this is an example of a case where there was a successful prosecution against a person 
who had uploaded material on the internet, it is clear that s.4A was never intended to deal with 
instant and asynchronous messages, and so the judges in this case were put under pressure to 
interpret the statute in such a way as to fit the facts.54  This resulted in a number of doctrinal 
issues being overlooked, distorted or confused. 
Firstly, there is the finding that the defendant does not need to be present at the time that the 
victim views the offending material.  This goes against previous case law which suggests that the 
defendant must be present at the time that the harassment, alarm or distress is caused.  For 
example, Chappell55, confirmed the requirement that the defendant be present at the time of the 
offence.  In this case a defendant was found not guilty of a s.5 offence where a woman had 
opened a threatening letter without the defendant there.  The court in S v DPP distinguished this 
case on the basis that the wording of s.5 states that the behaviour complained of must be ‘within 
the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby’, 
whereas this wording does not appear in s.4A or s.4.  This would, therefore, rule out s.5 as being 
able to be used in the vast majority of cyberhate cases but would allow s.4A and s.4 to be used.  
The judges speculated that this omission was potentially purposeful as s.4A was enacted in 1994 
and so was created with the internet in mind.  However, as the judges themselves point out, s.4A 
- as does s.4 - gives a defence to the perpetrator if they were ‘inside a dwelling’ at the time of 
committing the relevant act and the victim was also in that or another ‘dwelling’.   This defence 
makes it highly unlikely that the offence was created with the internet in mind given that it would 
give a defence to anyone who uploaded material whilst in a dwelling, and the material was viewed 
whilst in a dwelling.  This fact was acknowledged by the judges in S v DPP56, but it was not 
acknowledged that this severely undermines the argument that the omission of ‘within the 
hearing or sight’ of the victim in s.4A was intentional in order to cover cases on the internet.   
                                                          
53 As an aside, the court did not explicitly mention legal causation but this can be implied from their application of 
novus actus interveniens 
54 Chris Newman, ‘Offensive picture on the internet later shown to complainant by a third party causing distress’ 
(2008) 72(6) Journal of Criminal Law 481 
55 Chappell v DPP [1989] 89 Crim App R 82 
56 S v DPP [2008] EWHC 438 (Admin), para. 12 
A second problematic aspect of the case was how the public order element of the offence was 
dealt with.  Central to these offences is the need for the behaviour to be carried out in the public 
domain.  This is made clear by the inclusion of the dwelling defence, and cases such as Holloway v 
DPP57 which state that it is not the intrinsic nature of the behaviour that makes it criminal, but 
the fact that it is carried out in ‘public’.  Without this, these offences cease to be public order 
offences and become offences against the person.  The court in S v DPP did recognise the public 
order nature of s.4A by accepting without question the district judge’s decision that uploading 
material to the internet automatically puts it into the public domain.  However, somewhat 
confusingly, the court also went on to find that it was irrelevant whether the material was still 
present on the internet at the time the victim was caused harassment, alarm, or distress.58  The 
court relied on the unreported case of Rogers v DPP59  where it was decided that the victim had 
been caused harassment, alarm or distress when watching violent demonstrations via CCTV.  
However, in Rogers, the victim was watching the demonstration simultaneously with the event 
unfolding in real life, and not after the event had occurred.  This would suggest that to satisfy the 
public order element of this offence, and to be consistent with Rogers, the material would have to 
have been shown to be present on the internet at the time of the offence.  Without this, it is 
difficult to see how the public order element in S v DPP was fully satisfied.60   
A final point to make here is that, in addition to the doctrinal issues outlined above, s.4A, like the 
PHA offences, is a result crime as it requires the victim to have been caused harassment, alarm, 
or distress.  This means the offence can only be committed when a tangible harm to the victim 
has occurred.  This raises the question about what should the mischief be at the heart of 
cyberhate offences:  should the focus be on the harm caused by the perpetrator to the victim, or 
should the focus instead be on the conduct of the defendant?  This issue strikes at the heart of 
the underlying rationale for these offences and requires deep consideration of the harm caused 
by online hate.  This will be considered in more detail below. 
This analysis of S v DPP suggests that whilst s.4A and s.4 can potentially be used against a 
perpetrator of cyberhate, they are of limited use.  This is not surprising given that they were not 
created with the intention of covering internet-based offence.  Whilst the judges in S. v DPP did 
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59 Rogers v DPP (unreported) 22 July 1999, CO/4041/98 
60 It should be noted that in the case of R v Liam Stacey who was convicted of the s. 4A offence for tweeting racist 
comments on Twitter about the footballer Fabrice Muaba, the comments were available online and were viewed 
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stacey.pdf accessed on 29 September 2017 
make an attempt to expand s.4A to fit the facts of this particular case, inevitably there are limits 
to how far this can extend.    
 
3) Incitement to Hatred Offences 
Part III of the POA creates several offences relating to the incitement of racial, religious and 
sexual orientation hatred.  Under s.18-22 of the POA it is an offence to use words or behaviour 
or display written material, publish or distribute written material, make public performance of a 
play, distribute, show or play a recording, broadcast or include in a cabling programme anything 
which is threatening, abusive or insulting either with an intention to stir up hatred, or where 
racial hatred was likely to be stirred up thereby.  These offences were extended to religious and 
to sexual orientation hatred,61 albeit with some material differences that make it harder for the 
prosecution to prove that the offence has been made out.62     
Although these provisions were not enacted with the internet in mind, in Sheppard and Whittle,63 
Part III of the Act has been interpreted to include material written on the internet.64 In this case, 
Whittle emailed Sheppard some Holocaust-denial material.  Sheppard edited the material and 
then uploaded it to a website which he had set up himself, but which was hosted by a remote 
server in California.  The material posted on the website was accessible within the jurisdiction of 
England and Wales.  Sheppard and Whittle were convicted of several counts of s.19 of the POA, 
but appealed on the basis that the material was published in the US where such content would 
not be criminalised.  The court, however, confirmed the substantive (as opposed to the formal) 
test of jurisdiction65 laid down in Wallace Duncan Smith (No. 4) which determines jurisdictional 
issues based on whether a substantial measure of the activities which make up the crime took 
place in this country. The court determined that because the defendants were based in this 
country and the material was written, edited, and uploaded in this country, and that the 
defendants had control of the website which was clearly aimed at people in this country, there 
was no question that the court had jurisdiction over their material.  Thus, the court was not 
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63 Sheppard and Whittle [2010] EWCA Crim 824 
64 Matthew Dyson, ‘R. v Sheppard (Simon Guy):  Public order on the internet’ (2010) 2 Archbold Review 6-9 
65 Matthew Dyson, ‘R. v Sheppard (Simon Guy):  Public order on the internet’ (2010) 2 Archbold Review 6-9 
convinced by the defendants’ arguments that because the server was based in the US, the 
material was also published in the US, and therefore subject to US criminal law.   
Whilst in this case the defendants were found guilty of the relevant offences, there are several 
problems with the reasoning of the Sheppard case that means the scope of the provisions and 
how they relate to the internet are still unclear.   
For example, in terms of jurisdiction, on the facts of the case, it did make sense to confirm 
Wallace Duncan Smith (No. 4):  it was clear in this case that most of the crime had taken place in 
England and Wales as the defendants were located here, they wrote and edited the material here, 
and the material was directed at an audience in this country.  However, it is unclear what would 
be the outcome of such a case if the facts differed.  For instance, would the courts have found 
jurisdiction if Sheppard and Whittle had used a server in the US, the material was clearly aimed at 
an audience in this country, but the defendants were based in France?  Or what if Sheppard and 
Whittle and the server they used had been based in England, but the material was directed at a 
German audience?  It is not clear from the reasoning in Sheppard what would have been the 
outcome.  And yet these are scenarios that are very likely to arise.  The Court of Appeal did 
mention three different jurisprudential theories in relation to publications on the internet.  The 
first is that jurisdiction lies with the country in which the server is hosted (the country of origin 
theory).  The second is the country of destination theory which says that jurisdiction lies with the 
country in which the material is downloadable and the third theory is that jurisdiction lies with 
the country that was targeted by the defendants – the directing and targeting view.66  It would 
have been interesting to discover the view of the court on this, but they declined to comment 
given that they had already confirmed the Wallace case, and had rejected the country of origin 
theory as the facts did not require them to express a preference.  However, this does mean we 
cannot be certain what would happen in other scenarios, such as those outlined above.  The 
French case of Yahoo67 does appear to have opted for a broader interpretation of jurisdiction to 
take the country of destination view to say that jurisdiction exists wherever the material is 
downloadable.68  However, Sheppard did not appear to go this far.   
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Another issue with Sheppard lies in the definition of ‘publication’ adopted in this case.  The court 
opted to confirm the definition set out in Perrin69 which defined a publication under the Obscene 
Publications Act 1959 as ‘making available … material to any viewer who may choose to access 
it’.  As Dyson has pointed out, on the facts of this case there is no evidence that anyone other 
than the police officer downloaded the material.70  This broad definition of publication is also 
problematic when applied to the internet as it means that everything uploaded to the internet is 
‘published’ and therefore subject to the same rules and regulations.  However, this approach may 
not be appropriate for the internet where a more nuanced approach may be needed.  Account 
should be taken of the different ways in which material is presented on the internet, and how 
easily accessible it is.  Whilst all material is accessible in theory, anything which appears in, for 
example social media or below the line comments of newspapers, is likely to have a much wider 
audience than a stand-alone website, and so this needs to be taken into account when 
prosecuting such behaviour.   
 
Finally, it needs to be pointed out that whilst prosecutions under Part III are obviously possible, 
at least to an extent as evinced by Sheppard, the high threshold of these offences in other regards 
means that there are very few successful prosecutions in any given year, particularly in relation to 
religion and sexual orientation.71 This is because the wording of the offences is very tight due to 
fears that doing otherwise would give the police and CPS too much power to prosecute 
legitimate free speech.72  According to a recent study by Iganski et al, it seems that these fears are 
misplaced and it is argued that the CPS has been exercising its power legitimately and has 
remained within the boundaries of free speech.73  However, it could be argued given the tiny 
amount of successful prosecutions for this offence – both offline and online – it would be 
appropriate to consider whether the threshold is too high.74   
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In conclusion, it can be see that the current hate crime offences – the PHA, and both sets of 
POA offences – can provide some help to some cyberhate victims, but they are limited in their 
ambit as they were not created for online communications.  The next section will assess to what 
extent the offences which were designed with the internet in mind are better able to protect 
victims of cyberhate.   
 
B) Statutes designed to apply to the internet 
Two offences will be considered in this section – s.1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 
and s.127(1) of the Communications Act 2003.  Both these provisions have been designed to 
deal with online behaviour, but, unlike the offences discussed above, they have not been 
specifically created to deal with hate and hostility and they cannot be aggravated under the CDA; 
although, as is the case with virtually all other crimes, any demonstration or motivation of 
hostility against race, religion, sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability must be taken 
into account at the sentencing stage.75 If the MCA or the CA offences are used in a case of 
cyberhate, the victim in that instance will receive less protection for the hostility element of the 
offence than a victim of a public disorder offence or harassment or stalking offences because 
unlike those provisions, the hate or hostility does not form a constituent part of the offence and 
so does not appear on the perpetrator’s record, and neither can it increase the maximum 
penalty.76   
 
1) S.1 Malicious Communications Act 1988 (hereafter “MCA”) 
S.1 of the MCA77 makes it an offence to send to another person an electronic communication 
which is in whole or part indecent or grossly offensive.  The mens rea of the offence is to send 
the message with the purpose of causing distress or anxiety to the recipient, or to any other 
person to whom he intends that it or its contents or nature should be communicated.   
At the outset, it is important to note that the core of this offence lies in the sending of a 
communication which is indecent or grossly offensive, with the requisite mens rea.78  This means 
that the impact on the victim is not important.  In fact, even if the intended victim does not 
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receive the message at all, or if the victim does receive the message but is not in fact caused 
distress or anxiety, the offence is still made out.  It is, therefore, a conduct crime.  This is in 
sharp contrast to the PHA offences and s.4A of the POA discussed above which require it to be 
shown that the victim was caused harm.  As mentioned above, this raises an important question 
about the appropriate regulation of cyberhate: should we punish the conduct of the perpetrator 
or the effect of their behaviour?  This point will be developed further below.     
The MCA has been used extensively in relation to online communications on social media, but 
also in cases involving harassment.  The latest figures from the Ministry of Justice show that the 
number of prosecutions under the MCA has gone up dramatically with 122 prosecutions in 2005 
rising to a high of 897 in 2014, although we cannot know how many of these involved 
cyberhate.79  There is some evidence that the CPS has preferred to use the MCA and the CA 
even in cases of harassment as these offence were designed specifically to deal with online 
communications.80  However, the MCA is not entirely suited to harassment cases because the 
content of the communication needs to be ‘grossly offensive’ and not all behaviour which 
constitutes harassment will also be grossly offensive. It is clear, therefore, that the MCA is a 
useful tool against online communications.  However, there are some issues which mean we 
need to be circumspect about both its ambit and its effectiveness in the context of cyberhate.   
As mentioned above, the MCA is not an aggravated offence under the CDA.  This means that 
even if a defendant is found guilty under the MCA, and he or she was motivated by or 
demonstrated hostility against the victim, this will not be taken into account at the offence stage 
of the offence, although it will be taken into consideration at the sentencing stage.81  This does 
not sit well with the fact the CPS, in its guidelines, has pledged to take the ‘hate’ element in 
electronic communications more seriously, to the extent that a finding of hate may make a 
prosecution more likely than if it were a communication that were simply ‘grossly offensive’.82  
The effect of this is that a perpetrator who sends out 1 racially abusive email to 1000 people will 
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be guilty of an MCA offence, which cannot be aggravated under the CDA, but if this same 
person sends that email twice to one person, then this could be prosecuted under the PHA 
which as a racially aggravated offence will carry a higher penalty.  There is also the issue of 
labelling as it will mean the MCA offence will not carry the additional ‘hate’ label in the way that 
the aggravated PHA offence will.  Furthermore, if, as seems to be the case, the CPS prefers to 
use the MCA rather than the PHA in some cases of online harassment, this is problematic for 
cyberhate offences because it means that the victim of an MCA offence will get less protection 
than the same victim under the PHA.  This corroborates the point made earlier about the 
disjointed relationship between the different pieces of legislation, and reinforces the need to 
create a single coherent framework that is easier for the police and prosecutors to use.   
Another important issue here relates to identifying the mischief of this offence.  In order for a 
communication to come under the MCA, it has to be found to be ‘indecent’ or ‘grossly 
offensive’.  These terms are meant to be given their everyday meaning,83 but the term ‘grossly 
offensive’ is problematic given that under the ECHR we do have the right to offend.84  An 
important case in this context is Connolly, which involved a defendant who sent photos of 
aborted foetuses to pharmacists who were selling the morning after pill.  He was convicted under 
the MCA, but appealed saying that being convicted on the basis that the photos were ‘grossly 
offensive’ went against his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  The court, however, dismissed his appeal stating that ‘grossly 
offensive’ and ‘indecent’ do not go against his rights because a heightened meaning is given to 
those words by the courts, and that in any case, his convention rights do not justify him 
intending to cause distress or anxiety.85  
Even if Connolly is correct on this point and the wording of the MCA is consistent with freedom 
of expression, the terms ‘grossly offensive’ or ‘indecent’ seem particularly outdated for such a 
modern problem.  It is difficult to see how we can justify criminalising speech on the internet on 
the basis of ‘gross offensiveness’ or ‘indecency’.  When one considers the extent to which the 
incitement offences under the POA have very high thresholds in order to ensure no 
infringement of the right to freedom of expression, it is difficult to support, without deeper 
consideration, the existence of such a wide actus reus under the MCA which appears to give the 
state much more power to interfere with online speech.   
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Paradoxically, whilst the wording of the actus reus of the offence is very wide, the mens rea 
required limits the ability of the law to deal with certain instances of cyberhate.  The mens rea 
requires that the defendant intended to cause anxiety to whoever the communication was sent to 
or to whom he intends it to be communicated.86  This would mean that a defendant who posts 
messages without this intention – perhaps because he/she is writing on a forum to like-minded 
people – then the offence is simply not made out.  Whilst it could be argued that the wide actus 
reus is mitigated by the much narrower mens rea, if this narrowing means that the offence is 
limited in such a way that it cannot deal with certain types of harm, then the narrowing of the 
wide actus reus has occurred in the wrong way.  This shows that whilst the MCA has been 
specifically designed to deal with online communications, it has not been created to deal with 
cyberhate, and as such, is not the ideal tool for protecting victims of online hate. 
    
 
2) Communications Act 2003, s. 127(1) (hereafter “CA”) 
s.127(1) of the CA makes it an offence to send or to cause to be sent by means of a public 
electronic communications network a message (or other matter) that is grossly offensive or of an 
indecent, obscene or menacing character.     
This offence has been increasingly used by the CPS for online offences.87  In 2005, there were 
355 prosecutions under s.127(1), and in 2015 there were 1,715.  However, there are a number of 
problems with using s.127(1) to tackle online hate crime.   
Firstly, as outlined above, the CA is not an aggravated offence under the CDA, and so any hate 
element perpetrated during the commission of this crime will not be recognised in the offence 
element.   
Furthermore, it is clear from the case of Collins that the core of this offence lies not in the 
protection of victims, but rather in the need to safeguard the public communications system 
from being abused.88  When this offence was originally conceived, the communications system 
was publicly funded, so arguably, this did make sense.  Irrespective of any doubts about the 
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historical reality of this,89 it is certainly the case that the system is now privatised, so the rationale 
for creating such an offence has fallen away.90  Either way, it is clear from the wording of the 
offence that it is not designed to protect the victims of the communication.  In fact, there need 
be no victim.  As with the MCA, this is a conduct crime where the actus reus of the offence lies 
in the making of the communication irrespective of whether it was ever received by anyone.  
Indeed, it is even wider than the MCA because there need be no intended victim either.  Under 
the MCA you need to show that the defendant intended to cause someone anxiety or distress.  
All that is required under s.127(1) of the CA is that the defendant sends a message that is grossly 
offensive, indecent, obscene or menacing.  The mens rea for this offence requires that the 
defendant knew or was aware that the content of their communication was grossly offensive, 
indecent, obscene or menacing.91  This means that this would, for example, criminalise an online 
but private conversation between two racists on holocaust denial as the discussion could 
plausibly be characterised as ‘grossly offensive’.92   
This makes the offence very broad, and goes much further than the incitement to hatred 
offences which would only make such behaviour criminal if the comments were intended to stir 
up hatred or - in the case of racial hatred only - were likely to stir up hatred thereby.  Thus, in the 
example given above of the two racists conversing privately over the internet, they are given the 
opportunity to argue that no stirring up of hatred was intended - it was just a discussion about 
how to interpret history; nor was hatred likely to be stirred up - it was a private conversation.    
The incitement offences also give the defendants a defence if the communication was made in a 
private dwelling and not heard or seen except by other persons in that or another dwelling, 
whereas no such defence exists under the CA.  It is at least arguable that the racist holocaust 
deniers could claim this defence on the basis that both Ds made the comments in the privacy of 
their own home, and the conversation, whilst undertaken online, was not publicly available.  
Both these points mean that the CA offence is wider than the Part III offences.  This is 
problematic as the incitement offences were designed as our unique hate speech laws, and were 
purposefully constructed to be of limited scope in order to comply with freedom of speech.  The 
fact that the CA effectively criminalises online communications that would not fall within the 
                                                          
89 Thomas Gibbons ‘Grossly offensive communications’ (2006) 11(4) Communications Law 136 
90 Alisdair A. Gillespie, ‘Offensive Communications and the Law’ (2006) 17(8) Entertainment Law Review 236 
91 Chambers v DPP  [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin) 
92 This point has been made a number of times:  Nick Taylor, ‘Communications Act 2003:  ‘grossly offensive’ 
message’ (2007) 71(4)  Journal of Criminal Law 301; Alisdair A. Gillespie, ‘Offensive Communications and the Law’ 
(2006) 17(8) Entertainment Law Review 236;  David Ormerod, ‘Case Comment, Telecommunications:  sending 
grossly offensive message by means of public electronic communications network’ (2007) 1 Criminal Law Review 98  
incitement offences if they were uttered offline seems to override this careful construction and 
highlights the problem of the fragmented and piecemeal nature of cyberhate laws.   
The breadth of the offence and its potential for infringing freedom of expression, can also be 
seen in the fact that what is outlawed is communications that are ‘grossly offensive’ ‘indecent’ or 
‘obscene’.  It is difficult to see how proscribing such words would come within the Art 10(2) 
exceptions, as it is unlikely to be seen as ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to outlaw 
communications simply based on their gross offensiveness, indecency or obscenity.93  Trying to 
repress ideas or language simply because we do not like them is not sufficient within a liberal 
western democracy.   
In fact, overbroad offences such as s.127(1) bring the law into disrepute.  The infamous case of 
Chambers94 is a good example of this.  Paul Chambers was initially convicted of s.127(1) for 
tweeting a message saying ‘Crap! Robin Hood Airport is closed!  You’ve got a week and a bit to 
get your shit together otherwise I am blowing the airport sky high!!’.  This was intended as an 
ongoing joke between him and his girlfriend, and was not intended to be menacing; and indeed 
was not taken to be menacing by the off-duty airport manager who eventually came across this 
message five days after it was tweeted.    Chambers was originally found guilty of the offence, but 
was eventually acquitted two years after his original conviction by the Divisional Court.  The 
CPS was criticised for even bringing this case, and Paul Chambers attracted a large level of 
support both from the general population but also from prominent public figures such as 
comedians Stephen Fry and Al Murray.  As a result of this case, the CPS published their official 
guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media.  Whilst these 
guidelines have been seen as a step forward95 it is clearly unacceptable to have in existence an 
offence that is considered so broad that the CPS has to police itself.  The principle of legal 
certainty requires that our laws are clear and give citizens the ability to regulate their lives.  
S.127(1) clearly breaches this.  This serves to highlight once again the need for a much clearer 
articulation of the harm caused by cyberhate so that offences are both clear and certain, and 
come within the Article 10(2) exceptions.   
 
SECTION 2 
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 The discussion above has highlighted the shortcomings in the current legislation.  Existing hate 
crimes are too narrow to encapsulate anything other than a limited category of instances of 
online hate, whilst the technology based offences appear to be either very wide so as to 
contravene basic rights to freedom of expression, or to not be victim-centred. 
 
Before we go on to consider a framework for new online communications offences, two issues 
arising from the discussion above need to be considered in more detail.  The first relates to 
whether or not we need targeted legislation in this area, or whether we can simply use offline 
offences with minor amendments.  To answer this question, the harm caused by online hate will 
be explored in order to ascertain whether it differs from the harm caused by offline hate.  A 
second issue that will be considered will be how the provisions under Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights will be addressed by any proposed legislation on online 
communications. 
 
   
 
Online and offline? 
One question that arises from the analysis of the current offences is the question of whether we 
need separate legislation to deal with online hatred, or whether we can use the already existing 
offences under the PHA and the POA.  In the analysis above, it was found that whilst these 
offences can help protect some victims of hate, there are some obvious gaps because they were 
not designed to deal with online hate.  Meanwhile, the offences that are designed to tackle online 
communications are both under and over-inclusive and do not appear to fit in with modern day 
notions about the harm caused by cyberhate.  This next section aims to identify the ways in 
which the harm caused by online hate differs from that of offline hate, and to outline why we 
need separate targeted legislation to tackle it.   
Whilst much online hate will be very similar in content and effect to offline hate,96 the emerging 
research in this area suggests that there are differences that can have an impact on how we 
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regulate this behaviour.  For example, Fearn’s research suggests that there is evidence that some 
victims of hate crime are less affected by online hate than offline hate, but that in extreme cases 
the consequences can in fact be more serious.97   
There is, however, an additional harm caused by cyberhate due to the fact that these offences are 
committed on social media.  This brings with it a ‘public’ element which is quite distinct even 
from the PHA offences.  The ‘public’ element in the PHA offences is the threat to public order, 
whilst attacks broadcast on social media cause a harm that goes beyond the potential threat to 
public order, or even anxiety, harassment alarm or distress as encapsulated by the PHA offences.  
This additional harm is a reputational one because of the potential for public humiliation and 
embarrassment when comments appear on social media.   
This is compounded by the fact that an attack carried out on the internet is potentially 
permanent in nature, and can have an almost limitless reach.  Whilst there is no doubt that 
offline attacks can leave permanent scars and can cause immeasurable pain, the attacks 
themselves will usually be of a finite nature, and, once a perpetrator is caught, can be stopped.  
However, the permanency and reach of the internet can mean that online attacks never go away, 
even if a perpetrator is caught.  This means that a victim of online hate can be at risk of being 
exposed to the attack time and time again, thus rendering thems re-victimised. 
When viewing these three elements together – the publicness of the internet, its permanency and 
its reach – it can be seen that the victims of these attacks can be caused harm that goes beyond 
the damage caused by the words themselves.  Citron has described several case studies of people 
who have been attacked and harassed viciously on the internet, and she has illustrated the impact 
this has had on their lives.  As a result of comments and attacks made on social media, on 
discussion forums and on blogs, these women have lost their jobs, their relationships have 
broken down, and their lives have been torn apart.98  The examples Citron cites show clearly 
how the impact these online attacks have had on the individuals concerned goes beyond the 
harm caused by the initial verbal attacks.  The fact that these attacks have appeared on the 
internet, and are therefore publicly and permanently accessible to anyone have caused additional 
pain and harm.   
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97 Harriet Fearn, The Impacts of Cyberhate, 2016, PhD thesis, Sussex University (found at 
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98 Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Harvard University Press, 2014) 
Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that online attacks of this kind can have an impact on 
victims’ ability to maintain a public presence on the internet.  Some of the victims interviewed by 
Citron found that the easiest way to avoid the harassment was to simply stop using the internet.  
However, this had a severe effect on their ability to pursue certain careers.  For example, one of 
the women had hoped to become a journalist, but found that her attempts to write a blog – 
something that is now seen as a requirement for budding writers – simply attracted more attacks 
from the person who was harassing her.99  Both Fearn and a recent report by Galop have found 
that victims of cyberhate will often change their online behaviour in order to avoid the attacks.100     
Moreover, there is also increasing evidence that certain groups in society are more likely to 
attract hate when they have a prominent internet presence.  The Guardian recently undertook 
data analysis of the abusive comments left by readers on the ‘under the line’ comments section 
of its website in order to evaluate the intensity of hate levelled at their journalists.  Their research 
found that of the top 10 most abused journalists, 8 were women, and the other two were black 
men - one of whom was gay.101  A study by Galop found that 84% of LGBT+ respondents had 
experienced more than one incidence of online abuse, and that online hate targeted at members 
of the LGBT community was often aimed at silencing them when they spoke about identity 
issues.102  Thus, it seems to be increasingly clear that the hate perpetrated online is not equal, and 
some groups are suffering more than others.  Paradoxically, offline hate crimes do not include 
gender as a protected characteristic.  If the evidence suggests that women are particularly being 
targeted by online hate, then legislators need to give serious consideration to the inclusion of 
gender as a protected characteristic for any online offences.103   
So far, this discussion has focussed on how these three distinctive elements of the internet – its 
publicness, its permanency and its reach – can cause harm to the individuals who are the target 
of the hate.  However, these three features also demonstrate the fact that the harm caused by 
cyberhate extends beyond the individual, and can have a great impact on those who are 
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bystanders to that hate.  Indeed, a great deal of cyberhate is not directed at any one individual in 
particular, but is often comprised of generalised comments directed at specified groups.  There 
are three types of bystander that concern us here.   
The first type, consists of those bystanders who observe the hate targeted at race, religion, 
gender, sexual orientation, transgender, disability, and who share those characteristics.  Whilst 
research on this is in its infancy, there does appear to be evidence that these groups are affected 
by the level of hate targeted at their characteristic.104  Awan and Zempi argue that unlike offline 
hate where threats of violence are often at the core of hate crime, in the virtual world, the hate 
speech aims to ‘dehumanize and demonize’ and ‘relies on creating tensions’. 105  Their study has 
shown how Muslims exposed to negative generalised stereotypes about Muslims not only 
increased their feelings of vulnerability and fear of physical attacks in the offline world, but also 
leads to a perception of themselves as different, and leads to a disengagement with wider society.  
Fearn’s research has also shown that the harm of cyberhate extends beyond the direct victim of 
cyberhate and that it can have a negative impact on those who witness it.106  Awan and Zempi, 
and Fearn’s work is very important as it corroborates the more theoretical discussions about the 
harm caused by hate speech.  For instance, Waldron has likened hate speech to pollution that 
poisons the atmosphere, and acts as an obstacle to the full integration of minorities into 
mainstream society.107  Thus, it can be seen that individuals are harmed by online hate speech 
even if they are not the direct targets of this hate.     
Linked to this is a second type of bystander who comes across the hateful material, or who 
observes the unfolding hate on social media but is not themselves a member of the targeted 
group.  Research by Fearn has found that unlike offline hate, the impact of online hate can be 
felt at similar levels by those who are not members of the targeted group as those who are 
members of the targeted group.108  This is a very distinct type of harm, and confirms that the 
reach of cyberhate is more extensive than previously thought.  This also suggests that the harm 
caused by cyberhate goes beyond the physical or tangible harms we usually associate with crime 
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and particularly hate crime, and in fact is linked to broader social principles such as that of 
equality.109 
The third type of bystander of concern, is the bystander who might be influenced and even 
radicalised by their exposure to online hate.  For example, Perry and Olsson (2009) have argued 
that the internet provides those who belong to groups we might broadly define as ones peddling 
‘hate’ with the opportunity to ‘retrench and reinvent … as a viable collective’.110 It allows them 
to establish a collective identity and, Perry and Olsson argue, could potentially lead to a ‘global 
racist subculture’.111 The exchange of racist ideas can help normalise racist ideologies112 by 
enabling perpetrators to morally disengage from the harm caused by racism.113  Awan and Zempi 
have shown how victims of cyberhate have witnessed a mob mentality on the web, whereby one 
person can initiate the hate which is then replicated by bystanders who have observed the 
opening thread.114  Thus, it can be seen that the harm of online hate speech extends to the 
normalisation of racism and the radicalisation of individuals to racist ideology.115   
 
All these factors suggest that there is a distinctive element to the harm caused by online hate 
which the PHA and the POA are not able to capture.  Moreover, this discussion further 
highlights the inadequacies of the CA and the MCA which focus on concepts such as ‘gross 
offensiveness’ and ‘indecency’ which seem to have little to do with the reality of the harm caused 
by online hate.  Thus, a reformulation of the rules on online communications requires an 
overhaul of the existing regime with the creation of targeted cyberhate offences which are able to 
properly reflect the reality of the harm caused by cyberhate.   
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Freedom of Speech 
The section above has argued that targeted cyberhate legislation is needed in this area.  Given 
that any regulation of online hate by necessity requires the outlawing of words, it is necessary to 
outline the freedom of speech concerns in this area.   This section will give an outline of the 
issues and will create a framework for understanding what will be required to ensure any existing 
or proposed provisions on online communications are compatible with our freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ‘ECHR’).   
 
Under Article 10(1) of the ECHR:   
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.” 
There are, however, exceptions to this which enable States to create legislation which curtails 
citizens’ right to free speech so long as under Article 10(2) this is: 
‘…necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
the protection of the reputation or rights of others…’.116 
The European Court of Human Rights (hereafter “ECrtHR”) has established a rich body of 
jurisprudence on Article 10 which outlines to what extent States can deviate from the basic 
principle of freedom of expression.  This has established different levels of protection depending 
on the type of speech in question.  Of particular interest here is the Strasbourg case-law on hate 
speech.  A line of cases appears to have established a relatively low level of protection for speech 
deemed to incite hatred against minorities.  For example, in Pavel Ivanov v. Russia117 the applicant 
owned and edited a newspaper in Russia.  He published a series of articles where he claimed that 
the Jews were the root of all evil in Russia.  He was convicted of the offence of public incitement 
to ethnic, racial and religious hatred.  He complained to the EcrtHR that his conviction was not 
justified.  The court declared his application inadmissible because it said that such an assault 
against Jews was a fundamental attack against the Convention’s underlying values: notably 
tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination, and therefore came within Article 17 which 
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prevents the use of the Convention rights to ‘engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at 
the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms’ in the Convention.  Essentially, the Court was 
saying that the attack on Jews did not constitute ‘speech’, and thus did not engage Article 10 or 
its exceptions.  This gives this type of speech very little protection, and gives State a very wide 
berth when it comes to criminalising such behaviour.   
Indeed, such an approach was used in the case of Norwood v UK118 where the applicant had 
displayed a BNP poster in his window with the Twin Towers in flames and the words ‘Islam out 
of Britain – Protect the British People’.  He was charged with s.5 of the POA, and complained to 
the Court that his right to freedom of speech had been breached.  The court, however, said that 
the applicant could not use Article 10 to justify displaying the poster because the poster was a 
direct attack on the underlying values of the Convention, and so Article 17 was engaged which 
effectively disallowed him from any protection.  This approach, in principle, does make the 
outlawing of hate speech a fairly simple matter from the point of view of freedom of expression.  
Very little scrutiny of the legislation itself will be undertaken by the ECrtHR as long as the 
legislation is only aimed at hate speech, and not at any other speech. 
However, the issue is not as simple as this.  As a matter of principle, the approach of the ECHR 
in relation to hate speech is by no means welcomed by all.  There are many critics119 who argue 
that this does not give sufficient protection to people’s freedom of speech, and that subsequent 
case law has gone too far in using Article 17 as a way of excluding a proper discussion of 
whether the limitation was justified on its facts.  Furthermore, the application of Article 17 has 
not been consistent.120  Whilst it has been applied to ethnic hate,121 racial hate122, and religious 
hate,123 a different approach has been adopted in relation to homophobic hate,124 incitement to 
ethnic hatred125 and incitement to racial discrimination or hatred126.  In these cases, the ECHR 
has instead adopted an approach whereby the speech is found to engage Article 10, and so any 
legislation which prohibits such speech can only do so if the infringement can be justified under 
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one of the exceptions under Article 10(2).  This, therefore, requires the ECrtHR to give greater 
scrutiny to legislation involving these types of hate. 
The picture within the ECHR is, therefore, not clear, and the level of scrutiny each piece of 
legislation will attract will depend on whether it is defined as pure hate speech or other type of 
hate speech.  However, in the absence of a clear definition of what constitutes hate speech, as 
well as any clear justification as to the different levels of protection offered, it would be 
appropriate for the UK Parliament to take an approach which assumes that all hate speech 
legislation should be exposed to the higher level of scrutiny.  Thus, the presumption would be 
that all hate speech engages Article 10, and so any incursion into freedom of expression needs to 
be justified under the Article 10(2) exceptions.  This article will adopt this stricter approach to 
the issue of free speech and will recommend that any legislation on hate speech should only exist 
or be created where it can be shown that it is ‘necessary in a democratic society, in the interests 
of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others.’   
This means that the underlying purpose of each piece of legislation will need to be articulated 
and subsequently examined to determine whether the mischief it is protecting does indeed fall 
into the Article 10(2) exceptions.  Furthermore, as Handyside has made clear, it is not just the 
legislation itself that needs to be compatible with Article 10.  Each prosecution needs to be 
considered in light of the Article 10(2) exceptions.  Therefore, contextual factors will need to be 
taken into account to determine whether each prosecution is necessary and proportionate.  The 
CPS has already outlined a number of these factors in their Guidelines127 such as whether 
effective action was taken to remove the communication from the internet or whether it was 
intended for a wider audience.  This latter point is particularly important and will require a 
nuanced approach to material available online.  Currently, offences such as the CA make no 
distinction based on how publicly available the communication is, and so can capture within it 
private comments.  It is argued that any new legislation on online communication must contain 
guidance on how the context within which comments are made online can be important in 
determining the harm caused by that speech.  It may be easier to justify the prohibition of speech 
where a comment has been made publicly such as on social media or in below the line comments 
of newspapers, than it would to prosecute comments made on a personal blog or in a private 
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email.  Equally, it is necessary to accommodate the different way in which people converse 
online128 as well as the level of thought and preparation that has gone into the speech.129 
 
Reform Proposals 
It has been established that the harm caused by cyberhate is distinctive in nature to that of 
offline hate, and requires separate targeted legislation.  The discussion has also revealed that 
although the term ‘cyberhate’ is used to refer to online hate communications, it is clear that there 
are four different types of harm caused by online hate that emerge from the discussion above, 
and therefore separate legislation will need to be created to target these different types of harm.   
 
• The first type of harm is the same harm caused by offline offences such as the POA and 
the PHA.  This harm is caused to an individual when the harassment they experience 
takes place online but in a private form, through, for example, emails and text messages, 
and causes the same harm as offline behaviour, namely harassment, alarm or distress.   
• The second type of harm is the additional harm caused to an individual when the hate is 
communicated on social media or another public forum.  As well as harassment, alarm or 
distress, a victim in this scenario is likely to suffer additional reputational harm that may 
manifest itself in broken relationships, harm to career and an individual’s ability to 
maintain a presence on the internet. This necessitates a different offence than the first 
type of harm in order to recognise this additional harm.    
• The third type of harm covers the case of speech that is not directed at any one person in 
particular, but involves generalised hateful comments which poison the atmosphere and 
demonise particular groups of individuals who share a protected characteristic.   
• The fourth type of harm is the potential radicalisation of individuals or the entrenching 
of global hate movements.   
 
These different categories of offence can form the framework for a reformulation of the rules on 
cyberhate.   It is important when regulating cyberhate to take separate account of each of these 
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categories, and so discrete offences will need to be created.  Legislators will also need to give 
serious thought to including gender as a protected characteristic for online hate offences given 
that there is increasing evidence that women are particularly targeted by cyberhate speech.130   
 
In legislating for these different categories of harm, several considerations present themselves.   
As a starting point, all legislation must be compatible with freedom of speech.  It was argued 
above that it will be important in each case to articulate the mischief of the offence and to 
determine whether this makes the proscribing of speech necessary and proportionate in a 
democratic society.  Thus, it will be important to delineate clearly what the actus reus and mens 
rea of these offences will be.   
 
In relation to the first two types of harm, this is relatively straightforward if the focus is on 
creating result, rather than conduct crimes.  Result crimes such as the PHA and the s.4A offence 
are easier to justify from a freedom of speech point of view than conduct crimes such as the 
incitement offences, the MCA or the CA because the harm caused can be more easily quantified 
– someone has been caused harassment, alarm or distress.  If the offences in relation to the first 
and second harms outlined above are formulated as result crimes (albeit differently worded to 
the PHA and s.5), this will ensure they are compatible with freedom of expression.   We need to 
move away using words such as ‘gross offensiveness’ or ‘indecency’ which do not reflect the 
harm being caused, but are also difficult to justify as being necessary in a democratic society.  
Focussing on the harm caused in these cases will obviate this difficulty.  
 
However, when considering the third and fourth categories of harm, legislators will have to work 
harder to ensure these offences are compatible with human rights.  This is because these 
offences will, by necessity, be conduct crimes.  Whilst the justification for creating these offences 
is that they do cause the harms outlined above, the harm has not yet occurred and so the 
punishment needs to be proportionate to the actual risk.  This will require the threshold of these 
offences to be higher in order to ensure consistency with freedom of expression.  This could be 
achieved by requiring a high level of mens rea.  However, the threshold will need to be slightly 
lower than the existing incitement offences which currently offer little protection to victims of 
online hate.  Instead of a requirement that hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby, the emphasis 
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should be on prohibiting speech that is inconsistent with the values of contemporary society 
such as equality, tolerance, and community cohesion.  The fourth category will focus on the need 
to show that the words are being used in such a way that they are liable to radicalise or influence 
others to engage in hatred of the protected characteristics.131    
 
CONCLUSION 
The discussion above has shown how the current legislation on cyberhate is inadequate.  It does 
not reflect the real nature of the harm caused by cyberhate and is not designed to tackle the 
particular problems associated with online hate.  The fragmented nature of the current legislation 
also makes it difficult for prosecutors and the police to use.   
An argument for creating separate offences that deal specifically with online hate was put 
forward and a framework for the creation of new cyberhate offences was proposed.  It was 
argued that legislation needs to focus on four distinct types of harm caused by online hate:  harm 
to individuals in a private forum, harm to individuals in a public forum, harm to vulnerable 
groups, and finally the harm caused to society by the radicalisation of others.   
There is a level of urgency in relation to regulating cyberhate.  The Working Group on 
Cyberhate, which was convened by the American Defamation League and which includes tech 
giants such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google as well as academics and industry experts, has met 
to co-ordinate industry standards on how to deal with hateful comments on social media.  They 
have developed a code of conduct which is used by social media companies to set the standard 
of behaviour on their sites.132  Whilst this is clearly a sign that the issue of cyberhate is being 
taken seriously, it is important to be cautious about allowing self-regulation to continue to 
develop in this way without some guidance from Parliament as to whether the parameters of 
good behaviour as determined by these tech giants accords with freedom of speech.   For this 
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reason, it is important to create clear rules on cyberhate in order to ensure that citizens and 
internet service providers are clear about the boundaries of appropriate online behaviour. 
 
 
